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European Union Integration and National Self-Determination 
Mare Ushkovska 
International Communities Organisation 
 
Recent demands for secession in several EU member states bring the issue of self-
determination to the forefront of the debate about the future of the European Union. This 
article explores the European Union’s attitudes toward the international right to self-
determination in the context of the rising salience of the greater political union between 
member states. The focus of the European project, in direct contrast to the glorification of 
nationhood, is on consensual decision-making rather than sovereignty, making self-
determination obsolete in a reality of EU integration. This research finds that recognition of, 
or references to, the right to self-determination of peoples are absent from EU law sources. 
Official EU statements in the United Nations interpret the right to self-determination as the 
presence of a representative democracy and the ability to enjoy human rights within existing 
states. This interpretation implies that secession campaigns in EU countries are unfounded. 
The European Union demonstrates a strong preference for various forms of internal self-
determination (extended autonomy of regions, minority rights, and language rights) as an 
approach to address the diversity of peoples and regions within its borders. But the European 
Union has no legislative competences in these areas and the enactment of such policies is 
dependent solely on the goodwill of individual member states. By analyzing past cases of 
recognition by the European Union of newly independent states in the wider European 
region, this article demonstrates that they have been inconsistent and arbitrary, dependent on 
the strategic interests of individual member states rather than clear normative criteria.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In this age of globalization and regional integration in Europe, when the growth of 
supranationalist identities seems to be on the rise, the age-old struggle for independent 
governance of individual ethno-linguistic groups remains. Yet self-determination of peoples, 
while widely analyzed from a theoretical and historical perspective, is rarely discussed in the 
extant literature on the European Union. Furthermore, political debates concerning the self-
determination of peoples have long been side-lined with the rising salience of a deeper 
political union among European states. This article addresses in detail the European Union’s 
attitudes toward self-determination, as part of the corpus of international human rights and in 
view of European integration processes. It also seeks to provide a clearer understanding of 
the European Union’s position on the various ways in which national self-determination 
could take form on the political map of Europe. 
 
The European Project 
Sovereignty and Supranationalism 
The European project, a peace project in its essence, was developed in the aftermath of the 
Second World War as a joint attempt among European states to begin a new chapter in which 
cooperation, solidarity, and partnership would replace the rivalry, nationalism, and prejudice 
that were believed to have led to two devastating wars on the continent in only thirty years. It  
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was perceived that individual European states were not able to maintain peace and security 
and that nationalist rule should be replaced by a common path that involves forsaking 
sovereign exclusivity in policy making. For this reason, the European project was conceived 
in principle as antinational,1 or, at the very least, supranational or postnational.2 The Treaty 
on European Union in its article 1 states that the treaty “marks a new stage in the process of 
creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.” Thus, the European project, 
which relies on a supranational framework, offers a direct contrast to the glorification of 
nationhood that characterized international politics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  
The conviction the European Union holds today, reminiscent of the Vienna system 
established by Metternich in the nineteenth century, is that long-term peace and prosperity 
require the existence of a larger multicultural polity, where national identities and interests 
take a step back in the name of a greater good. European Commission president Jean-Claude 
Juncker has been very vocal in his criticism of attempts to “deconstruct” the bloc into 
national subdivisions, claiming, “There is no future for Europe as single nations.”3 The 
European Union favors consolidation over fragmentation and sees “unity in diversity” as its 
raison d’être.  
The European project is seen as incompatible, ideologically and systemically, with the 
pursuit of self-determination of peoples and with national sovereignty. Member states 
renounce a degree of their sovereignty when they join the European Union, because they 
agree to a consensual decision-making process on matters covered by the treaties. Even the 
decision to accede to the bloc is not an act of self-determination, since it requires the consent 
of all other member states (Treaty on European Union [TEU], art. 49). Some scholars would 
argue that it is paradoxical for regions or stateless nations in the European Union to seek to 
establish an independent state by calling on the right to self-determination, only to be able to 
later rejoin the European Union—a process in which they would substitute self-determination 
for co-determination—as new legal entities.4 One way in which European integration has led 
to the demystification of the concept of traditional national sovereignty is through 
undermining state competences in various domains, from monetary policy to immigration 
policy, and normalizing the existence of common regimes and the doctrine of shared 
sovereignty.5 Nicolas Levrat argues that because national projects are constrained by co-
determination in the European Union, individual European peoples no longer exercise self-
determination and the concept of self-determination in a supranational European polity 
becomes obsolete.6 
Nevertheless, the project of the “ever closer Union” has never been without its many 
challengers. In the first stages of European unification, in the early 1950s, the ambitious idea 
of developing a common European defense community met with rejection by the French 
parliament because of the unwillingness of France to concede its national sovereignty in the 
area of defense.7 Decades later, the rejection of the so-called European Constitution by a 
definitive majority of citizens in the Netherlands and France was a symbolic line in the sand 
marking the extent to which nations were willing to see the European supranational entity 
override nation-states. Nonetheless, political leaders across the European Union pressed on 
with their vision and introduced the Lisbon Treaty—a revised and renamed version of the 
Constitutional Treaty—which national governments could ratify without the need for a public 
consultation in the form of a referendum. Yet, the unprecedented rise in support for 
Eurosceptic parties over the past years among some of its founding members, such as Italy 
and France, as well as numerous other large member states, such as Hungary, Austria, 
Poland, and the United Kingdom, is a clear indication of the crisis the European project is 
experiencing in its objective to supersede national decision-making authority. As plans are 
proposed for further delegation of sovereignty to EU institutions for the purpose of common 
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border control and immigration policy, member states begin to dig in their proverbial heels in 
resistance to the proposed loss of powers of member states to (self-)determine their own 
paths. The decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, motivated by the 
value the British people place on sovereign powers, created a significant crack in the 
feasibility and durability of this postnational model of governance. 
 
The Construct of a European Identity 
The process of European integration, as spearheaded by the European Union since the second 
half of the twentieth century, has proven itself to be a process of transforming notions of 
states and nations, while at the same fostering a new polity.8 The project to construct a 
European identity follows a formula similar to how national identities are developed. If 
national identities rest on the common history and shared culture, customs, and values of a 
group of people, then European identity would be forged on the grounds of the common 
civilizational heritage (Christianity, Roman law, the Renaissance, democracy, etc.), mutual 
interests, and unifying value system of European states and their citizens. Furthermore, as 
collective identities are bolstered by the existence of a common enemy, or differentiation 
from the “other,” a European identity is reinforced when juxtaposed with the “rest of the 
world.” Thus, at various times during its development, the European project was presented in 
opposition to the Soviet Union, to emerging powers in the global east, or most recently to the 
United States, as it sought to become an “element of equilibrium” in a growing multipolar 
world.9 Finally, ideological identity and the political form are closely related,10 and states 
with their own sovereign institutions are best placed to enable the development of loyalty 
among their citizens toward that state as well as a national consciousness. Similarly, 
European institutions—those with democratic legitimacy and those without—are there to 
give a political form of the supranational European project and tend to inspire a sense of 
belonging among peoples that transcends national borders.  
The concept of European identity first appeared officially in 1973, when the heads of 
state or government of the nine countries that constituted the European Community at the 
time held a summit in Copenhagen, where they produced the Declaration on European 
Identity, through which they affirmed their determination to introduce the concept of 
European identity into their common foreign relations. The broad (and somewhat vague) 
definition of European identity offered in the declaration involves the common heritage and 
interests, the degree of common action of member states “in relation to the rest of the world,” 
and the “dynamic nature of European unification.”11 The original purpose of the declaration, 
directed toward third states, was to underscore the shared values that distinguished member 
states from other subjects of international law.12 At the time no thought was given to creating 
a European identity that would sustain a supranational project or a sense of loyalty toward the 
European Community.13 The text of the declaration notably makes two references to the 
common European civilization of member states and goes on to specify two key elements of 
how the European identity is to be perceived. First, emphasis is placed on the common values 
and principles of member states: democratic governance, the rule of law, human rights, and 
social justice. Second, in foreign affairs, the member states should progress toward common 
positions so they speak with one voice, allowing the “distinct character of the European entity 
to be respected.”14 As time since has shown, the first element has become the pillar of 
European integration, the second its ultimate purpose. 
In keeping with the 1861 statement by Massimo d’Azeglio, a leader of the Italian 
unification, “We have made Italy; now we must make Italians,”15 the European Union today 
seeks to seal the unification of the continent by making Europeans. Just as states need to 
create conditions by which all the people living within their territory identify with the state 
and feel a sense of belonging and loyalty, so must the European Union foster the European 
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identity. This is no small feat. Though the “European” denominator is at times used to 
distinguish the place of origin of citizens of European countries from those of other 
continents in interactions on an international level, there is as yet no European demos as a 
collective of which to speak. The European Union comprises twenty-eight individual nation-
states and many more peoples with separate identities. The Treaty on European Union, 
however, commits, in its preamble (par. 11), to reinforcing the European identity and its 
independence and, in article 4(2), to respecting the national identities of member states. 
Since, legally, the European Union is a sui generis entity, it can only follow that the sense of 
community related to it will also be sui generis, rather than mimic national sentiments.16 
Former European commissioner Olli Rehn believed that it would be ill-advised to pursue 
a plan whereby a superior and common European identity would seek to replace the existing 
national identities and the different political cultures of EU member states. The idea of 
eliminating all national sentiments is based merely on idealism, whereas reality suggests that 
such attempts would result in a pushback from nations, ultimately backfiring on the 
unification idea because it could create resentment among member states and resistance 
toward further integration. Instead, Rehn considered the nurturing of a dual identity as the 
preferable approach, with “the national identity being dominant for most people and the 
European identity being . . . supplementary and in accordance with the national identity,”17 in 
following with how European citizenship is supplemental to national citizenship. German 
chancellor Angela Merkel recently expressed the same view: “I think we should try to do two 
things at once: be European, but also regard our home countries as part of our identity. They 
don’t have to be opposites.”18 
Developing a common European identity is important because it may be needed to 
bolster the legitimacy of the European Union. Acceptance of an EU identity is theoretically 
linked to the acceptance of the European Union not merely as an important decision-making 
actor in the global arena that supersedes the domains on member states but as a truly 
representative polity that works for the greater good of its citizens. It is a vital question of 
image for the European Union, as the European integration project moves forward because, 
as Hristina Runcheva Tasev puts it, “many scholars of democratic theory pre-suppose a 
shared identity to set the boundaries of legitimate government—and this is complicated for 
the political system like the EU.”19 As noted previously, the close connection between 
ideological identity and political form guides the European Union to invest in the continual 
construction of a consciousness of commonality between the citizens of member states and 
the strengthening of a European identity through the setting up of a variety of educational 
programs, formal and informal (such as those on European studies in many universities 
around the European Union), through the use of public diplomacy, and through modern 
media. This fostering of a shared sense of belonging between Europeans would help 
consolidate the European Union’s supranational institutions and further broaden their 
competences by building its democratic legitimacy, because, as Runcheva Tasev points out, 
“democracy is not merely an electoral matter”; it “also requires socio-cultural cohesion in an 
institutional context or a public sphere.”20 There is as yet no analysis that shows the effect of 
European institutions on constructing a European identity. 
 
EU Approaches to Addressing Diversity of Peoples and Regions 
Minority Rights 
According to estimates, roughly 10 percent of the 500 million citizens of the European Union 
belong to a national minority group. The wide range of statistical-data-collection practices 
with regard to minorities in individual member states, however, makes it difficult to obtain a 
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definitive figure.21 Empirical research on minority issues has been further hampered by the 
varying definitions of minorities, particularly ethnic minorities, between states. Many of these 
minorities are peoples who have a national state but for historical or other reasons find 
themselves living beyond the delineated boundaries of that state, usually in border regions of 
neighboring countries. Among these are the 1.2 million Hungarians in Romania and the large 
number of Russians living in the Baltic states. Other ethnic minorities can be naturalized 
immigrants and their descendants, among whom are the estimated 3 million people of 
Turkish origin living in Germany. Finally, there are the autochthonous groups who do not 
have an independent state of their own and who, despite their inhabiting a region of a larger 
state for many centuries, have preserved distinctive cultural traits. These groups are the focus 
of this research. For them, unlike for other minorities, no independent political entity exists in 
which they form a national majority. Nevertheless, perhaps not surprisingly, the legal corpus 
of the European Union contains no provisions that distinguish these peoples from other 
minority groups. Thus, the only way to gain insight into how the European Union addresses 
the diversity of peoples within its borders is to review the EU mechanisms, if any, for the 
protection of minorities in its broadest sense.  
The most striking observation is that minorities were mentioned for the first time in 
primary EU law in the Lisbon Treaty. Before this treaty was signed, there was no legal basis 
for group rights of national minorities in member states, and any protection against 
discrimination had to be founded on general human rights instruments. In essence, this was 
the position often held by political entities centered on the civic form of identity—as in the 
European Union—that strong social and economic individual rights make group rights 
redundant. Avoiding topics of national minorities followed logically from the European 
Union’s long-term objective of reducing nationalist discourse and keeping considerations of 
national differences to a minimum. At the same time, “respect for and protection of 
minorities” was one of the Copenhagen Criteria obligatory for all candidate states wishing to 
join the European Union.22 Consequently, minorities in candidate states were in a better legal 
position to seek group rights than those in EU member states. And though the European 
Parliament has attempted to draft charters on minority and group rights, none of them has 
ever been put to a vote.23 
Minorities did receive a mention in article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty, as well as in article 21 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which has full legal effect for both EU member states 
and EU institutions but only in the context of general nondiscrimination provisions. 
Nevertheless, the issue of competences regarding the implementation of these rights uncovers 
a lack of ability by the European Union to act. That is, in keeping with the subsidiarity 
principle, competences that are not explicitly conferred to the European Union remain in the 
remits of member states (TEU, art. 4(1)). Specifically, all the areas of exclusive EU 
competence are listed in article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
and a closer inspection reveals that issues concerning language, culture, education, or regions 
are not among EU competences. Therefore, all claims regarding respect for minority rights 
remain solely declaratory because the European Union leaves legislation of minority rights to 
the discretion of member states. Once a state has acceded to the European Union, the union 
does not consider that state’s collective minority issues as its competence by the treaties. 
Yet, the mere fact that the European Union included, as one of the core values on which 
the union is founded, respect for “the rights of persons belonging to minorities” (TEU, art. 2) 
denotes support—though moral—for the promotion of minority rights within individual 
member states and the rationality of group rights for national minorities as one of the 
expressions of internal self-determination of peoples. The problem lies in the European 
Union’s institutional inability to produce any compulsory legislation and top-down 
mechanisms for member states, which in turn allows states to push back on measures that 
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they may perceive as threatening their national interests. Consequently, it is not possible to 
discuss a unitary EU policy on minorities and their role in society or in the democratic 
structures on a national and on a supranational level. 
Most, if not all, EU member states do recognize the need for attention to national 
minorities, in terms of their social inclusion, nondiscrimination against them, and protection 
of their culture, as can be seen by their positions in other intergovernmental organizations 
that deal with minority issues. When in 1992 the UN General Assembly passed the 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities, no EU member state opposed it. Every EU member state is at the same 
time a member of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and has agreed 
to the 1990 Copenhagen Document, a large portion of which is dedicated to minority rights. 
Yet, while almost all EU member states have become parties to the Council of Europe’s 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities from 1995, a notable 
exception is France (where the collection of statistical data on race, ethnicity, and religion is 
banned by law),24 which has not signed the convention, and Greece, Belgium, and 
Luxemburg, which have signed but not ratified it.  
 
Language Rights 
The European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages from 1992, established by the 
Council of Europe, has had a similar fate. France, Italy, and Malta have chosen not to ratify 
the charter, while Greece, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, and the three Baltic states have 
refused even to sign it. The protection of linguistic diversity in the European Union suffered a 
serious setback when France stated that, if it ever decides to ratify the European Charter for 
Regional and Minority Languages, it will emphasize that it views the charter solely as an 
instrument to protect Europe’s linguistic heritage in general terms and not as a tool that 
protects language minorities, such as those who speak the regional languages of Corsican, 
Breton, Alsatian, and others in France.25 Ironically, article 1 of the charter states that the 
purpose of the charter with regard to regional and minority languages is defined in the 
following manner: languages that are “traditionally used within a given territory of a State by 
nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State’s 
population” but are “different from the official language(s) of that State,” not including 
“dialects of the official language(s) of the State or the languages of migrants.”26 The 
definition of the scope of languages that are spoken by a numerical minority but have a 
traditional link with a given territory, unlike languages of immigrant communities, clearly 
points to the languages of stateless nations and historic regions, such as Welsh, Scottish 
Gaelic, Breton, Occitan, Sorbian, Basque, and Galician, or autochthonous minorities, such as 
German in parts of Poland and Italy, though none of these languages is listed by name. 
The position expressed by France, one of the largest EU member states, creates a 
roadblock to the linguistic rights of stateless nations, particularly as expressed in article 3(3) 
of the Treaty on European Union, which proclaims that the European Union “shall respect its 
rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is 
safeguarded and enhanced.” Although the treaty is vague on the scope of language rights, 
since this provision is in continuation of the same article that calls for the “rights of persons 
belonging to minorities,” it would follow that respect for cultural and linguistic diversity 
would go beyond the twenty-four official EU languages and include the sixty regional and 
minority languages spoken around the European Union.27 It has been suggested that one of 
the key reasons for France’s lack of support for the promotion of the status of minority or 
regional languages stems from the perceived links between some of its regional languages 
with separatist movements, such as in Corsica.28 
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Nevertheless, some contend that the opposite cause and effect relationship is true. By 
suppressing regional languages and ignoring the demand for wider recognition and 
preservation of the linguistic heritage of stateless nations, states may further exacerbate the 
divide between those peoples and their national majority and strengthen secessionist 
movements.29 The noticeable rise of independence campaigns by several western European 
regions is recent years has brought to the attention of the European Union that stateless 
nations want to see their culture and languages included and respected in the European arena, 
on an equal footing with those of nations with sovereign states. It has also been argued that 
the European Union acts in a discriminatory manner by not allowing EU citizens who speak a 
language other than the twenty-four official EU languages to communicate with EU 
institutions in their own language.30 This discrimination applies especially to languages such 
as Catalan, Basque, Welsh, and Scottish Gaelic, which have official status as regional 
languages in their states but are not official languages of the European Union or the treaties, a 
fact made that much more poignant when one considers that they have more native speakers 
than some official EU languages, such as Maltese and Irish. 
As mentioned previously, however, the amount of policy adjustment the EU institutions 
can do in this respect, without the political will of member states, is severely limited because 
language policy falls under the subsidiarity principle in the European Union and is an 
exclusive competence of member states. Still, the European Union can and does support the 
measures taken by central and local governments toward protecting minority and regional 
languages, primarily by allocating funding for educational programs and multilingualism 
projects and research, as well as for media dissemination of minority and regional 
languages.31 The European Parliament has encouraged the promotion of these languages. In 
2006, the European Parliament decided by a majority that native speakers of the regional 
languages with official status in Spain and the United Kingdom can communicate in writing 
with the Parliament and receive a response in their language.32 But these regional languages 
may not be used to speak in plenary sessions or committee meetings of the European 
Parliament, a privilege reserved for official EU languages. Similarly, the European Council 
agreed to allow for certain EU documents also to be translated into languages that have an 
official status in one of the member states, provided that member state agrees to cover the 
costs associated with the translation, as did Spain with regard to the Catalan, Basque, and 
Galician languages.33 
 
Regional Rights 
Contemporary debates about self-determination in Europe, however, are not driven 
exclusively by cultural, linguistic, or ethnic perspectives. In many instances this cultural 
element is secondary. What emerges is a marked tendency to promote the relevance of 
territorial self-government of stateless nations, placing the focus on advancing the status of 
regions. Most self-determination movements in the European Union embrace the idea of civic 
regionalism so that the pursuit of self-rule is connected to territorial autonomy, yet without 
the exclusivity of the traditional concepts of nationalism.34 Consequently, the postnational 
entity that the European Union strives to be seeks to manage the diversity of it member states, 
and the diversity of regions within those states, by changing certain key state paradigms, that 
is, (1) by modulating the role of national borders, and (2) by encouraging subnational forms 
of self-rule.  
The transformation of how EU internal borders have been perceived since the 
introduction of the freedom of movement and residence of peoples with the Maastricht 
Treaty, especially under the Schengen agreements, has become an opportunity for mitigating 
the thorny issue of the relative discrepancy between political and ethnic borders of European 
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peoples. Empirical studies have demonstrated that a dualism often exists in identities among 
peoples in border regions of Europe, such that they identify sometimes with their state of 
citizenship and at other times with their ethnic group, or they retain at once a sense of 
national and regional belonging.35 The removal of the functional significance of interstate 
boundaries that allows the peoples of the European Union to move freely across borders is 
believed to render irredentist movements pointless. Furthermore, it helps the narrative of a 
multilayered governance in the European Union, because the co-existence of national and 
supranational policy-making normalizes the idea of subnational governments, which would 
not be perceived as threats to state sovereignty. Thus, the concept of “permeable borders” is 
believed to help keep the territorial integrity of states intact while resolving potential 
frustrations of minorities and border regions.  
To this effect, the principle of subsidiarity—according to which governmental functions 
should be performed at the lowest level of government possible and thus states should 
execute only those tasks that cannot be done at a local level—was promoted by the European 
Union and accepted, in general, by regions and stateless nations who saw in this principle an 
opportunity to gain greater regional powers. It is important to note, however, that greater 
power for the regions was not the originally intended goal of the European Union’s touted 
principle of subsidiarity, which aimed instead at reassuring national governments against 
fears that the European Union’s supranational institutions would weaken their competences. 
The regional and local aspects of subsidiarity were mentioned for the first time only with the 
Lisbon Treaty (TEU, art. 5(3)), and then only in reference to a member state’s choice of 
whether or not to act at a central level. 
The concept of a “Europe of the Regions” emerged in the 1990s, when the forces of 
globalization and economic interdependence, on one hand, and the prospect of deeper 
European integration and stronger EU institutions, on the other hand, were seemingly diluting 
the relevance of the doctrine of the nation-state as the optimal political form. Individual states 
were seen to be too small to compete on the global market but at the same time too large to 
fully represent the local democratic will of their citizens. Thus, regions in European states 
were to be gradually included in the decision-making arrangements of the European 
Community as a third actor in its promoted “multi-layered” policy-making structure,36 in an 
attempt to “reflect better the cultural and national divisions within Europe.”37 This concept, 
of course, was focused not on cultural regions alone but on all regions equally.38 Over the 
years, regions have opened their lobbying offices in Brussels as a demonstration of their new 
role as stakeholders in the European Union, bypassing states as the traditional link between 
the subnational and supranational governments and seeking unimpeded access to EU 
institutions. From a mere 15 regional offices in 1988, their number rose to more than 160 in 
2002 and almost 200 in 2017.39 Some analysts have suggested that one of the driving factors 
for an increased regional presence in Brussels is the element of linguistic and cultural 
identities that differ from those on the state level and the intention to gain support from the 
commission on points of discord with their central governments.40 
More than two decades have passed, however, and the concept of a Europe of the 
Regions has been discredited. While regions have made progress and have been given a place 
at the table in certain EU forums, time has shown that their presence has in many aspects 
remained symbolic and the European Union has remained a state-centric system. While the 
concept of state sovereignty has evolved to become more flexible and accommodating for a 
degree of shared competences with supranational and subnational governments, the predicted 
decline and replacement of the nation-state has not materialized. The abandonment of 
optimism related to the Europe of the Regions plan has two main causes. First, contrary to the 
expectation that regionalist separatist tendencies would be abandoned, many nationalist 
parties have seized on the political momentum to give a boost to their movements for greater 
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autonomy, or even to provide an argument for their ability to be independent. This response 
was due, in part, to the ill-defined Europe of the Regions plan, which was left open to 
subjective interpretations and uses. Regionalist parties in Scotland,41 Catalonia, and the 
Basque country saw an opportunity to correlate their quest for regional self-government with 
the greater cause of European integration42 and, consequently, to appeal to moderate voters. 
Rather than its leading to nation-states’ becoming outdated, stateless nations, particularly in 
these prosperous regions, saw it as an opportunity to pursue their own nation-state projects.  
Second, the idea of Europe of the Regions proved naively oblivious to the substantive 
role of national governments. As with minority issues, other than rhetorical encouragement, 
the European Union has no competences in regulating regional relations and status within 
member states. Each state has the sovereign freedom to determine the territorial delineation 
of its regions, the extent of regional competences, and whether or not it will decentralize 
certain powers to its regions. Any powers regions may have gained are due to internal 
political reforms by states and the goodwill of those states to enact such reforms. Underlining 
the paradox, Catalan independence leader Carles Puigdemont remarked that “a Europe of 
regions created by the state is like electrical cars created by oil companies.”43 Regional 
offices in Brussels are not part of any of the EU treaties and as such their role in the policy 
process remains informal; thus, the impact of regions on an EU level has been described in 
the literature as “marginal”44 and “subterranean.”45 The aftermath of recent attempts by EU 
regions to proclaim independence has shown EU leadership backpedalling on the notion of 
powerful regions and returning to the concept of strong and unified states as the most 
appropriate and stable form of government.46 
Nowadays, the Committee of the Regions (CoR), a specialized EU agency established in 
1994 that comprises 350 representatives from regional and local governments of all EU 
member states, is seen as the forum where substate actors can become involved in EU-level 
policy discussions. The purpose of the CoR is to give “regions and cities a formal say in EU 
law-making ensuring that the position and needs of regional and local authorities are 
respected.”47 Nevertheless, this agency has shortcomings when it comes to providing the 
necessary tools for stateless nations and autonomous regions to exercise requisite 
representation at a European level. First, the committee is set up as an advisory body only, 
open solely for submitting opinions and consultations that are nonbinding to the European 
Union’s governing institutions, as determined in article 307 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union.48 Second, the CoR is not a setting where minorities, stateless or 
otherwise, can get representation as a group, unless a member of a minority happens to be 
elected as a local or regional official.49 Even so, that representative would not be acting on 
behalf of a given minority or stateless nation but would instead be acting on behalf of the 
local authority by which they were appointed. Finally, the fact that the CoR represents all 
subnational entities on equal terms, combining large cultural regions with small 
administrative regions and even municipalities, has been a source of its ineffectiveness in 
truly filling in the democratic gap between cultural regions and EU policy-making, leading to 
disappointment and frustration by those regions.50 
The term “constitutional regions” has been used in the literature to describe the set of 
cultural and large federal regions within the European Union that distinguish themselves from 
other subnational entities by their legislative competences.51 These include the devolved 
administrations of Scotland and Wales of the United Kingdom, the autonomous Spanish 
communities, such as Catalonia and the Basque country, the Belgian provinces of Flanders 
and Waloon, and the German and Austrian Länder, which, unlike smaller administrative 
regions (particularly in new EU member states), also have a distinct historical or linguistic 
identity. Thus, constitutional regions have been dissatisfied with the existing channels of 
communication with the European Union, which stunt their influence by merging them with 
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small administrative regions, and they have been lobbying together for a greater recognition 
of their unique legal status in the European Union and their right to have a more prominent 
role in its decision-making structures, particularly the European Commission.52 Thus far, the 
most visible acquired right is the participation of regional ministers in the EU Council of 
Ministers in cases involving those regions, under the clauses of article 203 of the Maastrich 
Treaty, which set the foundation for a nonintermediary communication with large federal or 
cultural regions.53 The participation of regional ministers in such meetings is dependent, 
however, on the domestic constitutional arrangement of individual member states. For 
example, in the United Kingdom and in Spain, the central government determines whether or 
not regional ministers attend EU Council meetings. In contrast, Germany’s strong federal 
political model enables the Länder to participate by default, an arrangement similar to the one 
in Belgium.54  
Perhaps the best-known EU approach for assisting regions is the aptly named “regional 
policy,” a set of financial resources available for the development of regions. In simple terms, 
EU’s regional policy, also known as “structural funds,” is effectively an instrument for 
delivering regional aid, with the goal of assisting poorer regions to catch up with 
economically stronger ones and achieve what is often referred to as economic, social, and 
territorial cohesion within the European Union. More than a third of the 2018 EU budget is 
dedicated to structural funds,55 one of the many reasons structural funds receive a good deal 
of attention. They are promoted as the most palpable method through which regions have a 
connection to Brussels and as an independent means of funding from their national 
governments. Critics have charged, however, that the narrative around the funds is merely 
symbolic, because, in practice, regions have no direct access to money from Brussels since 
the sector is intergovernmental. The program, nevertheless, allows the European Union to get 
some credit for providing for regional needs, while regional leaders have the semblance of 
direct cooperation with central EU institutions.56 
It can be concluded that, when it comes to opportunities for regions to partake in their 
own right in the policy-making processes of the European Union and to address issues for 
which there exists a discrepancy between the regional position and interests and the position 
and interests of their central governments, there are mechanisms in place enabling them to do 
so, but only if beforehand they secure constitutional concessions from their respective states 
granting them the necessary status and competences to act. The European Union has in theory 
supported the idea of proactive regions with sufficient powers to demystify traditional notions 
of centralized states, because, for one thing, subnational identities are seen as complementary 
to the strengthening of European identity. For this reason, the European Union has, at the 
very least, never opposed devolution within its member states. Nevertheless, such internal 
self-determination battles are to be fought on national arenas, a domain in which the 
European Union has thus far not intervened. Finally, there appears to be disagreement among 
researchers about whether the European Union as a supranational entity has opened up new 
opportunities for regions to advance their self-government57 or whether it has constrained 
them in their decision-making abilities.58 
 
European Union Attitude toward Self-Determination: Legal and Political 
Considerations 
EU Law with Regard to Self-Determination of Peoples 
The European Union, as a club of sovereign states, is organized in such a way that it 
represents the interests of those states through decision-making and voting mechanisms that 
allow individual member states and their governing institutions to act on behalf of the peoples 
that live in their territories as a collective. Paragraphs 6, 9, and 12 of the Preamble of the 
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Treaty on European Union refers to this system by which signatory states take on measures as 
representatives of “their peoples,” indicating an implied equality within the framework of the 
European Union between peoples and citizens. Examples in the literature support these 
changing perceptions of nations, arguing that in the era of globalization all people living 
within a state should identify with that state, setting aside the ethnic-centered understanding 
of “peoples”59—a concept already embraced by several European states, implementing the 
civic form of nationalism. Nevertheless, following the classical line of thinking about nations, 
not all peoples in Europe have their own state; thus, it follows that only those European 
peoples who have had the historical opportunity to establish a national state are able to 
participate in the co-determination processes of the European Union. 
There is no mention in the treaties of the European Union of a right to self-determination 
of those peoples or of self-determination in general. The question arises: Since general 
international law forms part of EU law and consequently is binding for EU member states 
and institutions, are specific references in EU law needed for the right to self-determination 
of peoples to be legally enforceable on EU territory, or is it a right stateless nations in Europe 
can exercise by extension? 
The European Court of Justice made a valuable contribution to the debate on December 
21, 2016, when, in its ruling concerning Western Sahara, it found that “the customary 
principle of self-determination referred to in particular in Article 1 of the Charter of the 
United Nations is . . . a principle of international law applicable to all non-self-governing 
territories and to all peoples who have not yet achieved independence. It is, moreover, a 
legally enforceable right erga omnes and one of the essential principles of international law” 
(italics added). 60 While it is clear that the court decision refers to Western Sahara’s frozen 
decolonization process and not a general EU context, in its ruling the court chose not to refer 
specifically to the context of decolonization but instead to stress that the right to self-
determination applies to all people. Similarly, the court chose to quote article 1 of the UN 
Charter rather than one of the many UN resolutions that deal uniquely with the right to self-
determination of peoples under colonial rule. This choice has led to some interpretations of 
the words of the court to mean that the right to self-determination is legally applicable to 
stateless nations in the European Union, such as the Flemish, Basques, Catalans, and Scots.61 
The wording in the decision by the European Court of Justice is in line with the 
conclusions made in 2010 by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. At the time, the international court rightly 
remarked:  
[D]uring the second half of the twentieth century, the international law of self-
determination developed in such a way as to create a right to independence for the 
peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation. . . . A great many new States have come into existence 
as a result of the exercise of this right. There were, however, also instances of 
declarations of independence outside this context. The practice of States in these latter 
cases does not point to the emergence in international law of a new rule prohibiting 
the making of a declaration of independence in such cases.62 
This conclusion, with the 2016 European Court of Justice ruling, makes it clear that the right 
to (external) self-determination of peoples, within or outside the context of remedial 
secession, is not specifically forbidden by international law and therefore not forbidden by 
EU law, which itself incorporates positive contemporary international law.63 
Nevertheless, a close examination of EU law sources reveals that self-determination as a 
concept, principle, or human right is absent from these texts. Certain European human rights 
instruments such as the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe 
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of 1990 do feature references to self-determination. But as international treaties, they are 
political, rather than legal, documents and do not form part of European law. Although 
stemming from international law, the EU treaties effectively create a “new legal order”64 for 
member states and their citizens that differs from public international law.65 Thus, the theory 
suggests that, while EU law cannot prohibit self-determination of peoples, it does not 
explicitly support self-determination of peoples either.66  
A source from the European Commission has expressed the belief that the existence of 
conflicts between states and some of their regions is potentially the reason there is no EU 
regulation on self-determination of peoples.67 Because of the political sensitivity of the issue, 
there should be a balance between EU law and international law. In this context, while the 
European Commission is aware that there are regional identities, they can be supported only 
in as much as they do not collide with the national identity of member states,68 because 
respect for national identity, as well as the territorial integrity, of member states is enshrined 
in article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union, even though the same article also discusses 
support for regional and local self-government. 
 
EU Statements on Self-Determination to the United Nations 
Because of the lack of any official legal documents referencing self-determination in the 
European Union, the union’s position on issues stemming from this principle of international 
law can be observed only from official EU statements made in the forums of the United 
Nations. In October 2001, for example, at a meeting of the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly, which deals with social, humanitarian, and cultural issues, a representative spoke 
on behalf of the European Union on the agenda item concerning the right to self-
determination of peoples. There, the European Union took the opportunity to reaffirm the 
relevance of that right in the contemporary international context as an integral part of 
fundamental human rights, as exemplified by its inclusion in the UN Charter and the two 
International Covenants on Human Rights. It is clear from this statement that the European 
Union sees the right to self-determination as part of the broader family of universal human 
rights, because a significant portion of the statement focuses on calling for respect for 
democratic principles and liberties, which are perceived to be directly related to the 
invocation of peoples’ right to self-determination. In a 2001 speech before the United 
Nations, a representative from the EU delegation noted that “making this right a reality 
requires full observance of all human rights and fundamental freedoms on the part of States,” 
thus identifying human rights as a de-facto precondition to the enjoyment of the right to self-
determination. 69 It was the delegation’s position that certain conditions need to be present in 
order for the right to self-determination to be applied, such as freedom of expression and 
freedom of assembly, but most important the right to vote, through which people can give a 
mandate to the representatives who best serve their interests. This interesting interpretation of 
self-determination as analogous to a democratic system was further reiterated in the statement 
that holding elections is not just a condition but an “expression of the right of peoples to self-
determination” and “the process of democratization is an essential stage in the recognition of 
the right of peoples to self-determination.” In a similar statement to the United Nations in 
2003, an EU representative concluded by saying that the “EU wishes to strongly reaffirm that 
the right to self-determination includes the opportunity for each individual to follow, support, 
and criticize actions of political institutions of their countries.”70  
While it stands to reason that the right to self-determination is related to other human 
rights, not least because of its inclusion in the International Covenants on Human Rights, the 
European Union appears to be equating this right to the presence of democracy in a society to 
an extent that eclipses the essence of what self-determination of peoples truly means. This 
simplification of self-determination to mean participation of citizens in the political processes 
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of states, or the expression of their political will through elected institutions, neglects the 
territorial aspects of the right to self-determination. It also overshadows the common article 1 
of the International Covenants on Human Rights, according to which the right to self-
determination of peoples means freedom to determine their political status in whatever form 
of social order that may be. By issuing these statements and tactically framing the matter of 
self-determination of peoples in this manner, the European Union sets out the basis for and 
limits the context in which it chooses to promote the implementation and respect of the right 
to self-determination internationally—by calling for the spread of democracy and rule of law 
around the world. 
In later years, EU representatives argued this case even more directly in a discussion of 
the content of the UN resolution drafts on the right of peoples to self-determination. (These 
resolutions, for the most part, retain the same format and wording year after year and are 
adopted as a matter of procedure, without a vote, first in the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly and later in the General Assembly sessions.) In November 2005, the United 
Kingdom mission to the United Nations spoke on behalf of the European Union about the 
resolution titled “Universal Right of Peoples to Self-Determination” to “explain the basis 
upon which the EU has been able to join consensus . . . on the resolution.”71 More 
specifically, the statement underscored the areas in which the resolution did not fully 
correspond to the positions held by the European Union with respect to the right to self-
determination and offered the general EU interpretation of that right within the broader 
context of human rights. The European Union referred to the right to self-determination as a 
“pillar” of the international order, intrinsically related to a democratic system that embraces 
the rule of law, stating that “respect for the right of self-determination requires the holding of 
free, regular and fair elections,”72 which in essence poses human rights as a precondition to 
the enjoyment of the right to self-determination. The European Union expressed its regret that 
there had been no opportunity to open a discussion on the text of the resolution so that it 
might better reflect the practice of self-determination, even though the text has remained 
almost entirely unchanged since 1980.73 Furthermore, the European Union noted that the 
resolution text contained certain inaccuracies under international law that needed to be 
addressed, specifically objecting to the mention of the right to self-determination of peoples 
and nations in the third preambular clause of the resolution.74 The EU position was that the 
right applies only to “peoples” and not to “nations” according to the International Covenants 
on Human Rights, which are a source of international law.  
Perhaps the most important remark in the European Union’s statement that best clarifies 
the its stance on the topic of self-determination was in response to the first operative clause of 
the resolution draft, where the right to self-determination of all peoples is named as the basis 
for the promotion of other human rights,75 to which the European Union objected: “Though 
as already mentioned the EU firmly believes that self-determination is closely associated with 
respect for all human rights, it is not correct to suggest that self-determination as such is a 
pre-condition for the enjoyment of other human rights.”76 The same position, with negligible 
alterations, was expressed by EU representatives in 200677 and was repeated again in 2009.78 
It is the European Union’s opinion that self-determination of peoples is not a necessary 
condition for the presence and respect of other human rights and that human rights and 
liberties can be present even in the absence of self-determination. Furthermore, as previously 
noted, it can be inferred from all EU statements to the United Nations on the matter that the 
European Union views human rights as a precondition for self-determination, not the other 
way around. Conversely, going back to the instances where the European Union equated the 
enjoyment of self-determination with respect for civil liberties and holding free elections, a 
second conclusion could be that peoples who already enjoy a full range of human rights are 
by nature able to self-determine (by expressing their political will through voting). Thus, it 
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would follow that, to the European Union, seeking independence, or what is known as 
external self-determination, becomes redundant in a democracy because of the wide range of 
opportunities for internal self-determination.  
 
EU Practice of Recognition of New Independent States 
Because new demands for recognition of independence by stateless nations continue to 
proliferate within and outside EU borders, it has become more imperative than ever to 
develop a principled approach in addressing each of these claims, enabling due 
considerations for the rights of peoples concerned, as well as the individual circumstances of 
each case. But in the light of the lack of norms in EU law pertaining to the right to self-
determination of peoples, we turn to earlier cases and look at the history of political decisions 
the European Union made when confronted by demands for recognition by newly 
independent states on the European continent in the past. A second wave of mass 
independence declarations in the twentieth century that occurred across Eastern, Central, and 
Southern Europe in the early 1990s, at the end of the Cold War, brought along a set of legal 
and moral uncertainties. The European Community needed to respond to the severity of these 
changes occurring in the global order. This was a turning point in history, where for the first 
time since the process of decolonization began, there had been multiple simultaneous 
demands for self-determination of peoples, requiring the European Community to come up 
with a (coordinated) response on the question of their recognition and, consequently, to usher 
an irreversible change to the international status quo. 
Taking the example of the Yugoslav federation, as claims for independence and military 
clashes emerged in Slovenia and Croatia in the summer of 1991, the European Community’s 
initial response was to try to preserve the existing, yet failing, federation, and thus uphold the 
political status quo. As Roland Rich points out, there was fear that the Yugoslav dissolution 
would set in motion many self-determination claims in the Soviet Union and destabilize this 
nuclear power.79 Outside of the European Community, very few other international powers 
took interest in the developments.80 Overall, the few ambiguous statements the European 
Community made on the topic indicate that they supported the preservation of the territorial 
integrity of Yugoslavia, in line with the accepted presumption in international politics that 
“favours the continuity and disfavours the extinction of an established State.”81 But at the 
same time it was made clear that there was no plan to intervene should a secession come 
about. 
In the end, as the disintegration of Yugoslavia appeared to be irreversible, the European 
Community took on a leading role in responding to the political and legal complications 
emerging from it. The foreign ministers of the European Community met in Brussels and 
issued a declaration containing common guidelines that set the normative basis for the 
recognition of the new states emerging in Eastern Europe. 82 It was the first document of its 
kind setting out the legal framework for the position of the European Union toward more than 
a dozen new entities, many of whom made unilateral declarations of independence. At the 
same time, it represented an expansion on the Montevideo criteria for statehood and a defined 
list of conditions for recognition. The declaration contains several noteworthy elements. The 
first is the inclusion of self-determination in the text as one of the principles guiding the 
European Community in its response to the new historical realities in Eastern Europe. Until 
then, self-determination was understood almost exclusively as a tool in the decolonization 
process.  
Second, the declaration added to the traditional Montevideo criteria. The four original 
criteria from the Montevideo Convention for an entity to be considered an independent state 
were for that state to have a permanent population, a defined territory, а government, and the 
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capacity to enter into relations with the other states. The Declaration of the European Council 
contains the additional requirement of a democratic governance for any new state wishing to 
be recognized as independent. Before the European Council declaration, having a political 
system different from a democracy had never been an obstacle, or a factor, in the recognition 
of new states. As Cedric Ryngaert and Sven Sobrie note, “the traditional legal framework had 
never concerned itself with the internal organisation of a would-be state, as this would have 
been considered an unlawful interference in this state’s internal affairs.”83 The declaration 
adds another three criteria to the traditional legal framework: the new state should not have 
been created through the use of aggression, it should commit to respecting minority rights, 
and it should commit to disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation. With the declaration, the 
European Council had drafted what can be described as an exhaustive, detailed, and strict 
normative framework, according to which requests for recognition of new states would be 
evaluated, that represented an expansion of the body of international norms dealing with the 
question of statehood. 
Furthermore, the European Council established the Arbitration Commission on 
Yugoslavia, which was assigned to evaluate each state’s adherence to the criteria. It was 
unclear at first what the mandate of this commission would be. The initial idea was that the 
commission would issue binding decisions on thorny issues concerning, for example, the 
right to self-determination, recognition, and state succession on the request of what they 
called “valid Yugoslavian authorities.” By supporting the work of the Arbitration 
Commission, the European Community. it appeared, at least initially, would pay as much 
attention to international law provisions as political considerations in the process of state 
recognition.84 In the end, the commission’s role was to offer nonbinding legal opinions, 
which proved to be a valuable addition to the body of international law on the topic of self-
determination of peoples through political independence.  
Before the Arbitration Commission had a chance to issue any recommendations, 
however, Germany issued a statement announcing that it would recognize Slovenia and 
Croatia, because in the view of the German government these two states met the conditions 
set by the European Community.85 Germany had been at odds with its European partners, 
previously stating it would recognize these two states, even if no one else did. From the 
beginning, the European Community had difficulty speaking with one voice and finding a 
common stance on this issue: While France was a strong proponent of preserving the 
integrity of the federation of Yugoslavia, states such as Germany and Belgium appeared 
somewhat open to the potential recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as independent states. 
What might be some of the reasons for such a foreign policy decision on Germany’s part? 
Many at the time argued that Germany was attempting to create its region of influence. 
Slovenia and Croatia were historically part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and culturally 
connected to the German-speaking and Catholic part of Europe. In fact, German recognition 
of these two newly independent states came on a highly symbolic date—December 24, the 
day Roman Catholics celebrate Christmas Eve. Furthermore, many immigrant workers from 
Yugoslavia resided in Germany, most of which were of Croatian origin, and many of them 
had the right to vote and lobbied the government to recognize Croatia.86  
The Arbitration Commission shortly afterward found that only Slovenia and Macedonia 
fully satisfied the conditions for recognition, whereas Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
needed to take additional measures. Nevertheless, the recommendations of the Arbitration 
Commission were not legally binding and different interests took precedence. Thus, many 
Roman Catholic European states extended their recognition to Slovenia and Croatia but not to 
Macedonia, which is predominantly Orthodox, or Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is 
predominantly Muslim and Orthodox. Others sought to retain unity within the European 
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Community and consented to Germany’s position, demonstrating the growing power and 
influence Germany had within the European Community.87 
David Raič has addressed these events by noting that EU states approached the situation 
by following political interests at the expense of international law: “It has been suggested that 
the recognition of the new States which were formed within the boundaries of the former 
Yugoslavia . . . must mainly be explained in terms of politics. In other words, the creation and 
recognition of these new States should be seen to have taken place mainly outside the domain 
of international law.”88 In the end, both Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were 
eventually recognized by the EU member states and accepted into the international 
community of states, though war-torn Bosnia and Herzegovina far sooner than Macedonia, 
despite Macedonia’s being the one that met all the legal conditions, which gives further 
credence to the political character of European Union’s practice of recognizing of new states. 
The European Union made similar considerations in the case of Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence. In a press release the day after Kosovo declared independence, 
the Council of the European Union stated that individual member states will make their own 
decisions on their relations with Kosovo in consideration of their “national practice and 
international law.”89 There was no detailed normative framework of criteria that Kosovo was 
required to meet before recognition, such as that which the European Community required of 
the other republics that emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia seventeen years earlier. 
Moreover, no assessment was made even of compliance with the Montevideo criteria, the 
third of which is having an effective government that operates independently from external 
control. Kosovo’s not meeting this criterion, because of the continued and influential 
participation of the UN and EU missions in its governance, was one of the many problems.90 
In the end, member states chose to proceed solely with political expedience for guidance.  
In their research on the international reactions following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration 
of independence, Ryngaert and Sobrie found that scarcely any mention of international law 
was made in statements, with recognition of Kosovo widely justified by political parameters, 
such as “the need for stability, peace, and security in the region.”91 In cases such as these 
where an entity is deficient in meeting some of the statehood criteria, the widespread 
recognition by most of the EU member states could be interpreted to have had a constitutive 
effect on the state of Kosovo.  
Appeals to the international law aspects of territorial integrity and state sovereignty have 
been made primarily by those countries that opposed recognition of Kosovo, such as Spain, 
Romania, and Cyprus. But in saying so, I would be remiss not to note the grave fear in those 
countries of active secessionist movements within their own territory and, consequently, their 
determination to block setting any precedent of recognition to breakaway states. Even their 
statements on the legality of the new state were motivated by political interests, rather than 
considerations of international law. The EU member states that did recognize Kosovo were 
concerned at least about the danger of the possible interpretations and consequences of such a 
precedent to the established international order and therefore always emphasized that the 
recognition of Kosovo was a sui generis case. Ironically, in a press release, the EU Council 
insisted that the European Union continued to adhere “to the principles of the UN Charter and 
the Helsinki Final Act, inter alia the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and all 
UN Security Council resolutions” but went on to say that Kosovo does not represent a breach 
of those “principles and resolutions.”92  
An examination of recognition history shows that the European Union has approached 
newly independent states in the wider European region with an eye to security-driven 
implications more so than concerns for international law or respect for human rights. As this 
review shows, examining the earlier practice of recognition of new states by the European 
Union does little to determine a pattern of specific requirements to be met by aspiring new 
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states, within or outside the European Union, which would render them entitled to EU 
recognition, since a “varying degree of attention [was] paid to international law depending on 
political considerations and strategic interests in each case.”93 In the past, the European 
Union had chosen pragmatism over normative considerations, leaving the door open to 
uncertainty and political manhandling for all self-determination claims since. 
 
Concluding Observations 
EU law contains no provisions concerning self-determination of peoples, as a principle or a 
right. The absence of such provisions in the text of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is 
noticeable and is clearly due to the political sensitivity of the issue. But international law is 
an integral part of EU law, and, thus, it follows that self-determination is an indisputable right 
of all peoples that ought to be respected, even without its being emphasized in EU law. This 
view was confirmed in a ruling of the European Court of Justice in 2016, which describes 
self-determination as a legally enforceable right erga omnes. Nevertheless, though stemming 
from international law, the EU treaties effectively create a new legal order for member states 
and their citizens that is different from international public law. Thus, even though EU law 
cannot act contrary to international norms, there is no explicit support in it for the right to 
self-determination of peoples. The European Union is, after all, a club of states and, as such, 
protects the interests of these countries as sole representatives of all citizens on their territory. 
In addition, ideologically and systematically, the European project is considered incompatible 
with the aspiration for self-determination of peoples or national sovereignty. Actions that 
might highlight the differences between different peoples in Europe are discouraged because 
the European Union is a political entity that strives to build a civic and supranational identity 
among its citizens in support of the project for a European political union. 
The European Union has made noticeable efforts to interpret the self-determination of 
peoples as respect for human rights and the existence of a democratic system. The European 
Union believes that nations that already enjoy a wide range of human rights are naturally able 
to self-determine by participating in elections and that demands for independence are 
unnecessary in democratic states because of the existence of a representative democracy and 
the wide range of opportunities for internal self-determination. The European Union tries to 
tackle the diversity of peoples within its borders through support and commitment to a certain 
degree of minority, linguistic, and regional rights. But when it comes to policies relating to 
minorities, languages, and regions, the European Union’s commitments are mainly 
declarative, since the principle of subsidiarity means that decisions and legislation on these 
issues are a discretionary right of individual member states. The problem lies in the European 
Union’s institutional inability to produce any mandatory top-down mechanisms for member 
states, which in turn allows countries to refuse the measures they consider a threat to their 
national project. There are striking differences between member states in whether and to what 
extent minority, linguistic, or regional rights of stateless nations are recognized, and any 
gains on these forms of internal self-determination have been due solely to the goodwill of 
some member states to enact such policies. 
Past cases of recognition of newly independent states in the wider European region by 
EU member states have been inconsistent, arbitrary, and dependent on the strategic interests 
of individual member states. Thus, it becomes apparent that the European Union has no clear 
normative criteria governing state recognition. Nevertheless, EU practice also demonstrates 
that the European Union has recognized virtually every independence claim emerging in 
Europe in recent decades (with the exception perhaps of Republika Srpska and partially that 
of Kosovo). Furthermore, the European Union has had no qualms about welcoming Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Croatia within its club, despite their being states all of which 
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at one time challenged the status quo of territorial borders and declared independence against 
the wishes of their parent state. As recent practice tells us, the European Union does 
recognize the outcomes of self-determination movements as a factual situation, once they 
have materialized into effective independent states.  
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